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Mind n s Commitment .t,Q. � Real: 
Parmenides B8234ff o 
by Alexander P .. D., Mou�elatos 
The University of Texas at Austin 
•av•ov 09 € cr•t V0€tV •€ xaL OVV€x€v �cr•t vo�µa 
F> ' ·  ui """ 9 &'  9 ·T ? 9 ' ou yaQ avEu •ou Eov•o; , EV o/ nE�a•tcrµEvov Ecr•tv 
€UQ�d€t; •o VO_Eiv· oi>OEV yaQ 1) Ed•tv 'l �ai:cq 
lAAo naQ€� •o� &ov•o;, &n€l •o YE MoiQ'&7t€O��€V 
T. f> "  P 1!0 - _fl F>w 9� .[< 9 � '"" ouAov axtv�•ov • EµµEvat0 •w 1tav• ovoµ Ecr•at or ovoµaa•au 
Qt ' � d1 � .... 1J /;>!} oaaa �Qo•ot xa•E&Ev•o 1t€not&o•E; Etvat aA�&�9 
yryvEa&ar •E xa1 �AAua&at, E1vaf •E xa1 o6xr, 
xal •o1toV aAAacrcr€tV 6ta •€ XQOa cpavov aµd'�€tV0 
One need not know very much about the history of ancient 
philosophy, one might just barely make out and translate the 
words "same", "thought 11, "being", "Fate", "name", to sense that 
this is an important and fascinating text.. Indeed, it is one of 
those to poi which regularly exercise the ingenuity of stud.ent s 
of Greek philosophyo An interpretation of it often colors, or 
reflects, one1s understanding of the metaphysics and epi stemol� 
ogy of early Greek philosophy as a wholeo. In proposing to 
undertake here yet another argument on the analysis of the pas­
sage I do not aim for anything like certainty or finality of 
exegesis., This would be too much to hope for, when we are work ... 
ing at such small scale, and all the more so in the case of pre­
Socratic studies, where the evidence itself is limited and frag ... 
mentary and our controls over language and background only too 
imperfecto Rather it is through an analysis of this passage 
that I can explain rJ10 st clearly and di re c tly a certain concep­
tion of the relation of mind to reality for which I al so find 
' 
evidence in other texts, in some of the characteristic 'aspects 
and themes of Parmenicles9 poem, and which I consider philos9� 
phicalJ_y and historically important., So let me proceed d:Lrectly 
to the. analysis, not pausing to review or to formulate the status 
guaestionis,_2 but taking up points of controversy as they arise., 
I 
Our text is not a fragment out of context; it occurs 
momentously in the climactic section of the poem's central argu!'"' 
ment, which we, more or less� understand., If we approach B8e34ff o 
as continuous with what has preceded,3 then we find ourselves in 
possession of two important clues for understanding the contro­
versial first line: (a) The presumption is that Tcxv-rov refers 
back to the s ub j ect under discussion in B8 as a whole, vizo &ov, 
11what-ison4 It must therefore function as subject in B8.,34, not 
as predica te.. (b) Since BB .. 34-41 is preceded by a deduction of 
the "completeness" of &ov 5 it is only logical to check for a 
possible connection between the key words voe:1' v and votJµa: of 
BS.,34 and the argument that what-is is ovx &,e:A.e:u't'TJ"tov, "hot incom­
plete n (cf .. al so B8 o 4 2 'e:' d. e: O'µ € v o v ) ., 
If we pursue this second clue, what comes to mind immedi­
ately is the many passages from the epic in which a •eAo�-word 
expresses the fulfilment of a thought, wish, or prophecy., The 
closest parallel is Ile 18.,328: "But Zeus does not fulfill 
(•e:Ae:v't'i)all thoughts (vo�µa:Tcx) for meno19 Also of interest in 
this connection is the expression Te:Aewµe:v µv&ov � "'.let us fulfill 
the thought0 (Od., 4., 776-7), and the formula-line cxuocx o • t 
<pQOVEe: t�. 't'E:AEO'CH OE µe: &vµo� avwye:v � II speak what you intend, and 
my heart prompts me to fulfill ito11 In a recent study of the 
.. 
-3 ... 
, -
't'e:A.o� -words in Homer> ZoP .. Ambrose observes: 11't'i::J..i::'tv does not 
only mean. u to do' o It means 1 to do, or make, or act in fu.11 
accord with some plan, command, prayer, promise or propheoy',110 
Aga;in: "The essence of the action of the Homeric verb -.�A.i::i)I . . .  
• • •  is to transform concept into fact, whether this concept be 
a promise or a plan or a prophecy.11117 All of this suggests 
strongly that the connection between BB.34 ... 41 aT?-d th� complete-. 
ness proof from which it grows ought to be sought in the fam;i� 
liar idea of 't'i::J..i::t'v voT)µa. Simplicius evidently saw this connec ... 
tion, as we may gather from his paraphrase: "for the sake of 
the thinkable, and it would be the same to say 'of 
being,' is thinking, since bei ng is its -.€J..o�" (Phys. 87.17 ... 18). 
Most critics would disregard this comment as a misleading Neo� 
platonist gloss.8 This is unfair to Simplicius, considering 
that the association of voT)µa with -.i::J..i::1' v is as old as Bomer. 
If we respect the presumption that 't'a{>-.ov refers back to 
, , ! i::ov, and if we do not ignore Simplicius' gloss, then the most 
plausible translation of BS.34 would read: 
11And the same thing is to be thought (or •to be known•) 
and is wherefore the thinking {or 'knowing1).0 
I have construed the Greek as: -.av-rov o' (subject) eO''t't voi::iv -re: 
(fir st predicate) Ka 't <€ O''t' 't> ot> vi::Ki::v EO''t' t voTJ µa (second p;redil"" 
cate).9 It is only fitting that a man who conceives of voeiv 
as a 11quest" should avail himself of the syntactic form �O' .. t 
voi::tv ="is to think of" = "is to be thought of." Statements of 
the form 11i t 1 s there to know, to apprehend, to �hink of" a.l'e 
exactly what we should expect from Parmenides. 
In his recent edition of the P�rmenides fragments, L. Tar�n 
avoids a similar construction ("The same thing can be thought and 
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is the cause of the existence of thought") on the grounds that 
it is "tautological and makes no sense in the context of Par­
menides8 argument .. ulO I frankly do not see the tautology in 
the translation cited by Ta.ran: the idea that the intentional 
complement and the cause of thought are one and the same is not 
a truism, but a metaphysical thesis which requires argument 
(cf. Descartes on the distinction between "objective" and "for­
mal" reality).. At any rate, I would like to show that the trans-
lation which I gave above, far from being tautological, is 
charged with a sense which is both striking philosophically and 
appropriate at this juncture of the argument8 
There is an important difference between la�t voe7v and 
The fir st tells us that &ov 11is there to 
think, to know," i&e. that it is accessible and available-­
perfect, complete and fully actual as it is--that nothing pre­
vents our knowing ito In other words, the first half of BS.34-
is a permission clause (though we need not translate ncan be 
thought") .. 11 As a permission clause, it does not by itself 
exclude other objects of thought, nor does it oblige mind to be 
directed to S:ov ., It has, in effect� the form of a hypotheti-
cal: If you should choose to seek D � €OV9 you will find it. But 
the second clause is stronger o It suspends the 191'if" and it 
cancels alternatives: thought is �vexev the what=is, i�e. the 
latter constitutes its goal, or constitutes the compelling 
authority to which thougit must submit.,
12 
The two clauses are 
complementarye The first guarantees the presence or the avail-
t 
�5-
ability of a certain object. But it posits no obligation for 
mind to seek it.i The second posit s the obligation, but gives 
no 1uarantee of the object as availability" The first clause 
says_ "you may," the second clause says "you must .. " Already 
this_ gives a pregnant, far from tautological sense to B8.3L1-. 
But we have only begun to draw out the significance of this 
very rich line., 
lt will be. recalled that o�vs:xa or oihs:xs:v has three 
uses: {a) uwherefore";· (b) 11because11; (c) "that" {= o"t't, fu�). 
Use (c) is generally regarded as a specialized case of {b).13 
Most recent critics wo.uld interpret the oi'.ivs:xs:v of B8.34 
under (c),14 whereas I have argued in favor of (a) .. Yet, I 
suspect that the other two senses are also involved in the 
thought of B8\>34.. What made possible the transition from {b) 
to (c) was precisely the .conception of the subject-matter of an 
utterance or thought as the cause which prompts the thought or 
utterance.,15 Note that we can say indifferently "final" or 
"eff':i.cient'' cause:· fact s compel us to think of them as they 
are; and the object of our desire invites or elicits appro­
priate thoughts from us., An important feature of the transla­
tion which I favor is that it expresses a doctrine which a 
Greek speaker could formulate after reflection on the etymo.­
logy of conjunctions such as o 9 lS .. i� and o�vs:xs:v. That reflec­
tion on etymologies . (real or supposed) is one of the charac-
. teristic devices of pre=Socratic thought is familiar enough, 
and r·equires no argument11 I am not suggesting, of course, that 
Parmenides simply recorded his understanding of the etymology 
of ovvexev = 0that'9 in the line under discussiono What I am say­
ing, rather, is that the line gains in poetical force by using 
a certain word to explain a conception which (conception) already 
controls another and familiar use of that same wordo 
Let us also not forge\; that this is a line about mind � 
reality., We learn something about each from ito Or reality it says 
that it is identically the same in expectation, or in anticipation, 
and in actualityo The very same thing which prompts thought (ovvexev) 
is th ere for us to know (�a�t voeivL This obviously continues the 
8�not incomplete, 10 in the section im.me-
diat ely precedingo Parmenides8 E:ov has the integrity of Zeus0 own 
word to Thetis: 
It is quite otherwise with the things of oo;a. As Parmenides might 
they are 
other in the knowing than they were in anticipation., This is an as­
pect of their nfaithlessness10 (cf,. B1.,30L Conversely, E:ov shows 
its good faith (cf., Blo29 &i..r1&efTJ<;; ev11:ei&fod in being identically 
the same as object given (�O'�& voeiv) and as objec'.t yearned for 
So the guiding idea of 11:rO'�t<;; (cf" 
BL,30, 8.,12; 
B8.50) is implicit in B8 .. 34� as well as the idea of the completeness 
of what-is., 
From the viewpoint of mind, B8e34 contains the striking doc­
trine that voT)µa is about, or for the sake of, or is compelled by&ov. 
This is a new element in the argument.. So far the E:ov has been 
presented as something unfamiliar and remote: something_ lying 
11far from ·the . beaten. track of men., n The idea that 
-7-
it is the ovvc:'M.c:v of thought (without qualification) appears here for 
the first time. We should now examine B8.34 together with its sequel. 
"And the same is to think of and wherefore is the thinking. For 
not without what-is, €v � nc:q:ia'ttaµevov &a .. tv, will you find think­
ing. For no other thing, but what-is, either is or will be, since 
it was just this thing that Fate· shackled to be whole and immo­
bile." {B8 ., 34-38 ) lb 
We must, for the moment, leave the difficult expression, &v � 
untranslated. The rest of the text can be constru� 
ed independently. What should not be missed is the emphatic concaten-
ation of references to E:ovg ' " 't(.W'tOV ' 
't'ov;.o, 11not without the . .. .  ; " 
"the same thing;" t ... " ov yO(Q avc:v 
"in fon, upopl which;" o.OoE:v • • •  
"not any other thing except tne . . ..  ; " 'to ye 9 "spec i-
fically this . " The phrase ''you shall not find thinking without what-is" 
a. 
should be under stood on the basis of11 Platonic parallel, Soph. 237d, 
probably a deliber ate imitation of Parmenides' language, put in the 
mouth of the Eleatic Stranger: 
"We speak the word 'it' at each instance with reference to some­
thing-that-is l&v�t)1 for it is impossible to speak it �11 by 
itself, naked and deserted ( yv µvo v xo:'t &nTJQT)µwµevov, as it were , 
by all the things-that-are." 
To paraphrase Plato: you shall not find the word 11it" naked, or desert­
ed by the-things-that-aree To paraphrase Parmenides: you shall not 
find thinking naked or deserted by what-is. 
Against this background it would appear� � priori, that the sense 
is, roughly, "to whicn (..§£. the &ov) it (�. 
" 
� ) 't'O VOC:tV refers" or "to which it is addressed". But the usual trans-
lat ion, "in which it is expressed ["or reveale<l/", is rather far from 
this sense. Most readers would concede that this is at best an un­
satisfactory. rendering . For it is not at all clear how we should inter ... 
pret the doctrine that thought is expressed in what-is.
17 Besides, the 
G , ' , reek nC:qJO('t'taµc:VOV C:a'ttV carries the sense of the present perfect 
-8-
much more prominently than does the. Englis h "is 
expres se dn .. But the translation "in which it has been expressedn be­
comes even.more strang e .. 18 
The key to the phrase is, I believe , not in the participle 
p 
n:e:r.pai: 1 crµe:vov (from a rare verb,. the semantics of which are unavoid-
ably obscure) but in the phrase EV �0 0 0 &cr-rtvo The usual translation 
assumes that &v has vaguely locative or instrumental force" It has 
been overlooked that the Ev together with e:T�at can have an idio­
matic se n se "to depen d on, to_ rely upon� to be under the authority of" 
(cf o English nit 8 s up to 11) o l 9 What is perhaps even more significant: 
this use appears to have its p aradigm in the anc ie nt image of God 
"holding" the fate, or t.he fulfilment� or the outcome of all things: 
J,, , ' ' "' � � (l � ' � � ��� �i:ot µe:v i:aui;a ve:wv e:v youvao'& xeti:ai 
"But these thing s lie on the knees of the gods." (ll. 17 .. 514) 
Of special interest for Parmeni des is the affinity of this conception 
with words such as n:e:1' QCXQ and i:€1..oi;;; g 
d' ti D M 0 !> /7 � v&x�� ne:iqai: e:xov-rat e:v a3ava-ro�o't 3eoE�&. 
"The peirata of victory are held by the immortal gods .. " (IL, 7 .. 102) 
.9 � % /7 f) � (l, rkJ  p rkJ � 
e:v i:ot� yaQ -re:/..o� e:cri:1v oµwi;;; aya3wv i:e: xaxwv i:e:0 
"On them (sc .. on Zeus and Poseidon ) rests the telos for good and 
evilo" (HeS:- Q:Q_., 669) 
Ze:u n:ai:�Qooon:av oe -r€A.oi;;; &v -riv �Qywv0 
"Father Zeusouand the telos of all labors rests with you .. 11 
(Pindar Nern., io .. 29) 
If this is inde ed the force of €v �·oo€cr-r&v here, then the relevant 
parallel out of .the few occurrences of cpa-r � l;;w is obviously the one in 
which the verb has some of the force of "to promise": -r<;i '�� &e:?ii;;; cr�v 
11having promised your unwed d augh ter to the son 
of the goddess,0 (Eur .. Iph;Lg_,, Aui., 135L In Parmenides cpo:-r[l;;w occurs 
once again at B8.,60,, The goddess uses the word to announce her descrip­
tion of the physical world 16so that no mortal opinion may outstrip 
youo" As used here the verb becomes still one more token of the rela­
tionship of n:rcr-rii;;; between her and the Kouro s o The goddesscpai:tl;;e:1 
-9= 
and the Kour9s is asked: " xoµtaai 
20 
11guard, cherish, preserve18 (B2 .. l) Q 
This clearly belongs with the ' p 1t t a"t'o� A.oyo� (B8., 50) and the solemn 
hand-shake (Blo 23 L. So in B8 .. 60 cpa"t' i'i;w means not only "I explain, 
I show, I make plain11 but also 11I give, I bestow, I commit, I entrust .. " 
Correspondingly, a " " ne:cpa"t'taµe:vov vo�µa would be a thought not only 11spo-
ken or ''declared, 11 but also "bestowed'' ' or "committedo 11 
' 
Now if the main connection of the phrase is ev � • • •  ea;. t' v, then 
is a circumstantial participle .. 21 This makes any and all 
of the following translations possible� 
30on which it depends, once solemnly declared;n 
"on which it depends, having been solemnly dec lared;" 
"on which it depends, as solemnly declared .. 19' 
Or combining all three: 
"to which it stands c ommittede1122 
We should now look at the sequel of B8e34 from the double stand-
. t f • " po in , once more, o e:ov and voe:t v. With respect to the first, the 
are still recognizable, 
although subdued., At least part of the force of B8 .. 35 is that D P €0'\I 
will not desert or abandon its trustee, -ro voe:&v. Again, when we read 
that this is because "Fate shapkled it,11 we think naturally of the 
bonds of trust (nfa"t'��)� whJch, in this case, bind reality to its 
station, as well as to the other party, mind or discourse� Similarly, 
part of the force of 11there is and will be ["note the pairing of pres­
ent and futur e? no other but what-is,n is that in an imagined inter-
val {per impo ssibile� ) between thought and its real'ization in 
there will be no tricks, no substitutions, no adulteration .. 23 
. ..  
€Q '\I 9 
The 
reason given( ene: &) for the continued firm attac·hment of what-is 
to mind is immobility, just as the o-t>ve:xe:v of BS .. 3224 assig ned the 
-10-
complete or accomplished na ture of what-is to the immobility deduced 
for it in BB.26-31. 
But the more important points are made with reference to mind., 
It will be convenient to assign number s to the clauses ot ·the "sequeuce 
sc) ... that we may study the lo gical structure: 
1 .. And ( 0€) the same is to think 
2 .. and is wherefore th� thinking .. 
3. For ( yaQ) you shall not find thinking without what-is, 
4 .. to which it stands committed .. 
5 .. For ( yaQ) no other either is or will be except the what-is� 
6.. since ( E:ne: [) it was jus t this {-ro ye:) that Fate shackled, 
so as to be whole and immobile. 
Clause 1 needs no explanation. The whole argument up to this 
po int has the force of '0it1s there to think!" It is, as I argued 
earlier, the seco?d clause which contains the radical suggestion: 
D � e:ov 
is not just available; it is that which always compels and attracts 
mind. It w ould seem to me that the entire sequel of B8 .. 34, including 
(as I will try to show) B8 .. 38-4l'Jl is elucidation and support for this 
radical claim.. The most direct way to bring this out is to cast B8 .. 34ff .. 
·into the form of a dialogue: 
1� Goddess: And that very same thing is there to think, and is 
also the wherefore of thought .. 
2. Kouros� Yes, I see what you mean about it's being there .. We· 
have been talking in t erms of a journey to it all along.. But 
· what9 s this about its being the "wherefore" of all thought? 
3 .. Q...,. You shall not find thinking without what-is. 
� K • .  Why? 
4 .. G .. Because ( yaq) it stands committed to it .. 
K. I donut see that., Why should mind be co mmitted specifically 
to what-is and not� sa:-y� to X or Y or Z? 
5., G. Because ( yaq) there simply neither is nor will there be 
any other thing (for it to be committed to). 
-11-
!• Why not? 
6. G. Because it is only what-is ( •o ye:) that was properly bound 
by Fate to be whole and immobile. (Im}licatiom All other !' s, 
Y1s and zes are loose and faithless. 
What makes me think that this, or something very like it, is the 
correc t interpretation of this passage is that emphatic concatenation, 
which I pointed out earlier, of references to E:ov . It is natural to 
assume that thi.s continued focus on the 
. , e:ov is intended to serve as 
an exclusion.. It must obviously exclude candidate s to the status of 
being the o1>ve:Ke:v The conclusion reached is thatE:ov 
the actual and implicit object of all thought because nothing else 
could possibly be its object.. The whole argument amounts to this: 
1. t " e: OV is a possible object of mind. 
2. No other entities could possibly fill that role. 
is 
3. So E:ov is not only possible but a necessary object of mind. 
It is important to appreciate the radical character of the doc-
trine of BB.34-38, as I have translated and explicated the text here. 
Parmenides is telling us that voe:1 v and , VO'r)µCX as such (the text is 
unqualified) are necessarily implicated with, or bound to, E:ov. It is 
not simply the µu&o� or the A.oyo� of the goddess, but human thought 
as well, the voe:1v of ordinary mortals no less than that of the privi­
leged revelation to the Kouro s, which is tied to what-is. 25 So the 
revelation of the Parmenidean poem has the characteristically philo­
sophical mood of making explicit that which is implicitly possessed 
or yearned for by all men. 
Against this interpretation one could cite B6. 5: "helplessness 
in their breasts steers their distracted mind (rtA.CXXTOV voov).u . 
Moreover, in Bl6 we find a voo� which changes according to the state 
of "limbs that have wandered much ( rtoA.vr..A.ayK•wv), " and in B7. 2 and 
BS.17 , voo�-words appear in contexts which imply that mind could 
-12-
actually take the route not of 11oooiso.,"11 but of 11., o <>is. not.,"" 19 o How 
can we reconcil e this w.ith the doctrine of B8.,34ff o on the interpreta= 
tion giv en here?26 
Actually, the conflict is much less serious than it appears at 
first sight., Although voo\; and its derivatives is primarily an 
"achievement" or 11success11· wor d {in Ryle 0 s sense), it is quite natural 
that, on occasion ,  it should anpear in contexts which bear the sense 
of task or failur.eo 27 · So the oxymoron of th.e expression 1tA.awro\; voo� 
does not involve a lo gical inconsistency., A similar oxymoron may be 
found.in B2� where Parmenides announces plural routes which 
"are for thinking," but the n allows only one of them.,28 
Moreove r, to say that mind is always 11wi th," or "on account of 7 I! 
or "committed to" the real does not mean that these two entities exist 
all along and for all men in the same relation which was established 
for the Kouros as a re sul t of the reve lation., That would have made the 
revelation unnecessary., The relation belongs not to the realm of fact 
or to psychology, but to an ideal, or normative realm, at the level of 
oneus logical subconscious., 
'-
In other words , when we speak of a " ne ce s sary relationship be-
tween mind and reality we ought to keep distinct the two aspects of 
nuni ver sali ty" and nnorm1Y or 11propriety11 in this modal t�J;'!Jl., 29 So to 
say 11you shall not find thinking without what=is, to which,it stands 
committed11 need not mean that thinking is already there, attached to 
what-is., It0s not everyone who is aware of the involvement--just you 
(the Kouros) and only from :!:!QJi. QQ ( the future tense may very well have 
this significance) , as a re su lt of a chal lenging argument .. One might 
compare t he familiar expe rience of hindsight: 191That must be what I 
had in niind!'1n30 
�ow lik� the stibconscious of psychoanalysis, the logical sub-
-13-
conscious has its ways of making itself felt even at the surf ac e .. 
Elements in the factual or c onsciou s level reflect and reproduce the 
idea:l order which o bt ains in d epth . Something of this sort can be seen 
in the structure of the argument in B2 to B8. The openly negative route 
is unques_tionably wrong., No one wants to take it. But mortals think 
and_ speak in term s which obscure or disguise from the_m the fact that 
they have actually veered off course, that they are now travelling the 
negative route.. The purity of their intentions, as it were, conceals 
"error, wandering." The challenge of B6 andB7 was pre-
cisely that it c o nf ro nted mortals with this facto And it takes most of 
the ar g ument of B8 to make good this "contentious challenge." Mortals 
are "two-headed" in J ust this sense: they really want 
to their ineptn e s s (&µrixav[ri) they land with � ' Jl , -ro µ1') e:ov� 
.. . , -ro e:ov, but due 
The concept of voe:1' v 9 vooi;; a:ppear s at three levels here: At the 
deepest level we come to see in a clear and rigorous sense that voe:7v 
is of, about, because of, or for the sake of what-is (as the latt er is 
understood after B8).. At the surface level, this "ontological commit­
ment"· is felt as a preference for expressions couched in positive terms. 
But in between the two, a certain gap develo ps between intention and 
performance.. The fault is not on the side of what-is, for it has nccr-rti;;. 
It is we who, somehow, violate our implicit pledge (cf .. ne:qia't' i O'µf vov) 
to the real. 
The interpretation I am developing here will be clarified if we 
consid er some instructive parallels.. The philosophy of Logical Atom­
ism, formul ated and defended by Russell and Wittgenstein in the early 
decades of this century, postulated thr ee stages in the relation of 
thought to reality similar to the three stages distinguished above. At 
the mo st primary level, simple, pr imi t:i,.ve names stand in a d ir ec t rela­
tion of reference to the simple con stituent s of the world. The latter 
···�z�u_._ . .,::;n.JQ 
are minimal sense data according to Russell; for Wittgenstein tb,ey are 
"atomic objects16:il entities which are defined only as the limit of ana= 
lysis (Wittgenstein refused to commit himself on their nature) o At any 
rate, these natoms11 are quite unlike the objects or things we acknow­
ledge in everyday experienceo At this familiar level; we operate with 
names such as nTom11 or 16Fido 16' or 18Homer" 10 Names of this sort do not 
refer directly to real con stituents; they are abbreviations for more 
or less elaborate descriptionso By successively� analyzing these descrip­
tions toward greater explicitness and precision, we finally reach the 
real atoms, which constitute their ultimate9 although implicit� refer­
ence" It is in this transition that confusion sets ino We fail to 
understand our own tacit rules of translation from the familiar to the 
primary levele31 
In an ideal or normative sense,32 all thought is "of" or "for the 
sake of" these elementary constituentso But it is only through philo­
sophic argument and elucidation that we come to realize thi s o  So the 
task of philosophy is to make explicit someth ing to which we are already 
committedo This notion of implicit ontological commitment is formally 
analogous with the' Parmenidean conception� expressed by means of the 
phrases: 
There are? of course, even more ancient parallels for this con= 
ception of the relation of discourse to realityo We immediately recog� 
nize the analytical or reflective outlook of the tradition of logical 
atomism as one of ancient line eg it goes back to Plato" What is 
especially interesting for an interpretation of Parmenides is that Plato 
employs the preposition hExa or �ve:xe:v at climactic points of philo= 
sophic argument to introduce the ultimate or supreme object of all 
inquiryo33 MQreover� in a number of these passages i'VExa appears 
framed by metaphors which o.ne associates with Parmenideso This use of 
the preposition both illustrates and serves to mediate the character� 
i stically Fla.tonic conception of knowing as a process of retrieval or 11 
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recollectiono The preposition points like an arrow to the object of 
our philosophic quest.. We "know" it before we �· it o We permanently 
belong to it and it belong s to us, but we have somehow beco:rre estranged .. 
Whether at the small scale of a philosophic conversation, or at the lar­
ger scale of a life-long quest, it is the hold of this relationship 
which make.s inquiry possible.. The analo gy between Plato vs "re collec� 
tionl' and psychoanalysis (Freud), or philosophical analysis (Russell, 
Wittgenstein, Moore), is one that has been explored often enoug h . So 
I must not dwell on it here.. What I wish to suggest is that something 
of this analytical or regressive conception of the nature of thought is 
already present in P�rmenides .. 
I would further like to suggest that Parmenides was not the only 
one of the pre-Socratics to con ceive of inquiry in these terms. Recall 
how Heraclitus speaks of the Logos: it is the common and permanent 
possession of all men; and yet, this, which is most intimately and se­
c ur ely theirs, is precisely what men fail to acknowledge (Diels-Kranz 
22B72). Men are asleep: they are not alert to the realities of this 
one, common world (22Bl cf., 22B30).. They are not aware of that which is 
most obvious (22B56), and this is ab surdly paradoxical, for "how could 
one fail to notice that which never sets?" (22Bl6) They are like deaf 
people; they are present and yet absent (22B34),. They. are . like travel­
lers who have forgotten where the route leads (22B71)., So the goal of 
philosophy must, of necessity, be one of self-knowledge (22Bl01). 
I find it illuminating to place Heraclitus'' B2 next to Parmenides 1 
22B2:· 6 to OEt �rte er.fl.at i:<;> !;uvii'.1• 't'OU �o you o· E O \l't'O� !;uvou t; �o'Uctt\I 
• �� • • • ,,. �  " 'lo . . ot rtOAAO� w� tutCX\I EXO\l't'E� �QO\l�cttv. · · "For this reason it is necessary to follow the common; and while 
the Logos is common) the many live as if they had a mind of their 
own.," . 
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"And the same is there to think and is wherefore the thinking; 
for not without what=is, to which it stands committed, will you 
find thinking a ii 
To the expression 1ncommon111 (!;vvov), in one text corresponds .. ai'J'tov, 
"the same;·� in the other .. What Heraclitus says by way of polemic Par­
menide s says more as a diagnosiso The points registered are, of course� 
different: as different as the Heracli tean Aoyoi; is from Parmenides9 
• t7 
s:ovo But there is common ground between the two passages to this ex-
tentg the or the &ov is not just there, it is not just a pro-
posal or a challenge' it is, rather� the correct51 and obligatory, and 
implicit object of all q>QOVTJO' ii; 
l]l 
Against this background, I now would like to argue in support of 
the reading ovoµCXO''t"CX& for the end of line 330 Leonard Woodbury, in an 
important article34 which, curiously? has not received the hearing it 
deserves from recent editors, pointed out that this reading is superior 
to the preferred ovoµ( a) EO''t"a & by criteria both of paleography and 
interpretationo35 I will not undertake to repeat Woodbury's arguments 
here, but I will cite what he considers a telling weakness in the text 
ovoµ(a) EO''t"(H) viz .. that this is intelligible only in the translation 
nwill be �name�" where the crucial word is the gloss supplied by 
the translator.. The interpretation which Woodbury develops from the 
. ,, 
text ovoµaO''t"a� is not altogether convincinge He interprets ... � 
referring to an unnamed subject "the world", rather than to &ov, 
as 
which .is the more obvious candidate; 36 and he interprets the latter as­
the name of this subjec t-=as if &ov had to appear in quotation markse 
But Woodbury0s text is attractive independently of his interpretation� 
the translation would read� 
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BB.38 '' .... With respect to this thing have all names been spoken .. �?11 
I would add three more considerations :if" 1.1lt in support of Wood-
bury's text with the translation just given: {a) ' , With c:ov as the 
subject of the proofs of B8 there is the same .presumption that "t"W 
refers to &�v as there was at B8.34 that "tav"t"ov has that reference .. 
(b) After the emphatic ,, "t"o ye: 9 ,just one line above, the hearer or read-
er would mcst naturally take "t"� as the demonstrative pronoun. Indeed , 
the whole weight of that chain of referenc e s to what-is which begins 
at BS.29 (8 pronoun references, _ _  and &9v featured 4 time_s)_w.�.es it� " 
most unlikely that "t"� should". not be taken w:\_th that reference. The 
parallelism of €v � at BS .. 35 and "t"�• at B8.38, both after the B caesura, 
is especially strong ,,38 (c) The present perfeet-ooµo:!'.l'i:at is very 
p ' ' appropriately placed between the 1t£q>l'l-rt(1µe:vov e:O'-rtv 
Of BS .1+2. 
Of Bs.:<..35 " th v an(j e 
If we are to do justice to the translation given, above, we should 
pause to clarify the logic of the Greek concept of Hnaming" or "calling". 
Expressed variously by verbs such as it in-
voJves basically the same three part relation which we find in a fami­
liar use of English "to call": 
"And God (A) called the light (B) Day (C). 11 
Between (A) and (B) we have a sub,ject-object relation which is roughly 
one of referring, pointing, singling out.. The element (C) functions 
as an internal ob j ect of the verb: it spells out the "content" of the 
verb's action {it gives what the older grammars used to call .. the 11ef­
fectedn as distinct from the "affected" ob j ect of the verb). This 
places {C) in a relation of apposition to {B).. Indeed, this apposition 
amounts to identity.. For it is pr ecisely in the logic of the sentence 
given to authorize the statement: 
11The light is Day .. 11 
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In Greek this relat ion of (A)-(B)-(C) could be expressed in e ither 
of two wayso One would be the exact counterpart of the syntax with "to 
call" in the example g iven: Subject-D irect Ob.ject (accusat,ive)-Inter­
nal Object (accusat ive) "39 Another is the construct ion we find in 
B8.,38: !_ ovoµa,et 
enc e t9) ;lio 40 
C (= the internal accusative) ' , e 1t t (on, with refer-
The most important thing to apprec iate about eith er of these 
constructions is that the element Q. carries me aning prior to enter ing 
in this three�term relation., The same holds for "to call" in the sen--
tence ci te,d aboveo If we say "God called the l ight Day 911 we are allow­
ed to ask "Why?"., And we are entitled to an explanation of the form 
"because light is of such-and-such charactero" (The Bible, it w ill be 
re c alled , proceeds to give just such an explanation in a vast number 
of s imilar passages: "She shall be called Woman, because she w:as 
taken out of man"; 11And Adam called h is wife's na.me Eve; because she 
was the mother of all living.," ) In o t he r words, C is treated as an 
abbreviated description., Th is is born out by such permiss ible para-
nhrases as::' .:· .''. , 
·'· 
11It w ill be spoken of� Daye" 
"It will be known Q:l.. the name of Day., 11 
The name is understood here as a verbal recipe which w ill help us se­
lect or recognize the phenomenon.. In Greek the te ndency to g ive ex­
planations after statements of the form 19A called B-Q."; is very strong 
. d d 41 in ee .. 
To return to the text of B8,,38-41: is pass ive, 
an 
the element (A) will be under stood �Qo•o1'c;; 9 li&by men".. The element /\ 
(C) is in !SO"O'a �Qo•o& etc.,, "the th ings which mortals etc,,11 This 
relative clause attaches itself to an understood internal subject 
ovoµai;a 0 Finally, the element (B.) appears in the dative i:�o As we 
saw just now, "to speak names" does not in th is context mean "to utter 
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sounds"', but rather "to (meaningfully) describe". The immediate pa.ra ... 
phrase is: It is this which mortals are describing when they say • •• ; 
mortals have called it Y, but it actually is !· 
On the translation defended here, B8.40-41 appears as a list of 
types of utterance made by mortalso They say: ( ) " t b. It a • • •  came o e ••• 
and " • • •  cease d to be • • • " ; {b) 11 • • •  is • • •  11· and " .... is not •• • " ; (c) 
42 n·· • • •  alters its place" and "• .. . transmutes color and/or shape." What 
makes these types of judgement "mortal", in the pejorative sense, is 
not so much that they conjoin contradictory ideas; rather each of the 
conjuncts is objectionable by itself. This holds for the " • • •  isoo•" 
of mortals as well as for the 1110eois not .... " The "••ois • • •  11 of mortal 
thinking is one which can easily turn back into " ... .,is not •• • " Simi­
larly, they expect that " • • •  is not • • •  " could have a determinate sense. 
So the list is, in effect, a disjunction of six types of mortal judge­
ment. Parmenides is telling us: no matter what it is that mortals 
say, they must say it with reference to what-is. 
We are now in position to appreciate a parallel, often noticed, 
between B8.38-41 and certain passages from Empedocles: 
•trNot for one of all mortal things is there a growing-to-be 
(Cfl�at�}$ nor is there attainment of baneful de�th; there 
is, rather, only mixing and alternation of the ingredients 
mixed: it is with reference to these that the name of growing­
�o-b�e iS Spoken amongmen (qi�at� O� btl 'tOti; ovoµal;;�-.cxt 
o:v&Qw1to tat v). " (Diel s-Kranz 31B8) 
"And when they f sc. the constituent g/ emerge in the a;ir having 
been mixed on (the pattern of) man, or on that of the kind of 
wild beasts' or on that of plant�s' or o� tha}; of bird�, that 
they then call getting-to-be ('to'te µev •o Aeyoucrt yevea&� 
and when they fall apart, that, correspondingl� they call 
µ.phappy dep.th. ,.They do n.ot speak by the Right of Justice 
l ll {}eiiis; o'IJ xaAe:ou(Jl'�), 4-3 but by Com.rention I speak so myself 
(voµi;i o' &7trcpT)µt xa! av'tod." <31B9)'+1+ 
The Empedoclean doctr ine involves the following logical steps: 
(1) Men speak in terms of coming-to�be and death. (2) lhis language 
is untrue or unfaithful to the facts- ... there is no &€1.tti; 
. 
· .. � � 
"'. , 
• .• . �,J., 
in it--be-
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cause there are no such processes in reality; there is only mixing and 
unmixing_., (3) These are the pro c esses which the language of generation 
and perishing refers to, but which it mi s descri be s .. But one may comply 
with acc e pt ed usage, provided he understands the true or real counter ­
parts of expressions such as in birth n and "death" .. 45 
Here, once again;, we see the three moments in the relation of 
di sc our se to reality which we found ear lier in the tradition of lo gical 
atomism, in Plato, and in Heraclituse Empedocles is not simply attack­
ing the language of mortals: he is also inter preting ito He shows how 
it is in touch, ultimately, with the real processes of the world, though 
prima facie it conceals and obscures these processese 
So in Parmenides B8 o 38-41 we have the culmination of the thought 
of B8 .. 34, and of the proof of "completeness'' from which this section on 
thought and .reality grows.. We might r epr e sent tbe course of the argu-
ment in a scheme like th e following: (1) The • t7 s:ov is complete, accom-
plished.. (2) The &ov itself is availabl e to mind but is also that 
which compels and attrac ts mindo (3) Mind is implicitly committed to 
the (4) There could be no other ob ,ject for mind to seek .. (5) 
All human di sc our se ha-s the D � s: 0 v' . as its only true and ultimate referenceo 
We see, then, that the three clauses at the end of lines 34,35, 
and 38 are strictly parallel, indeed equivalent: 
"Wh f 0 th th 0 k 0 II D 'l' t7 D 
17 
ere ore is e in 1ng, = s:v w ne:qio:HO'µs:vov s:O''ttv, ttto which it 
"with ref er enc e to it have all 
names been spoken"" The effectiveness of the whole passage lies pre­
ci sely in this logical crescendo: the same thought is given succes-
sively stronger and more explicit statements., 
To convey my understanding of B8.,38-41 I gave, earlier, the para­
phrase: Mortal s call it 1, but it actually is Xe This. is normally how 
we should understand the passage from what we know of the construction 
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OVOµcti;;EtV For as we saw, "to name X ( as) Y" in Greek does 
not mean to attach the sound 11Y" to X, but rather to describe � in terms 
of Y, which is thus assumed to already have meaning independently of its 
naming relationship to !� So the relevant categories for interpreting 
this passage ar.e not meaningfulness vse meaninglessness but truth vse 
46 :falsehood.. The parallel from Empedocles bears this out. Human 
disc.ourse describes the world in terms which are false to the world's 
reality,, 
This par allel between Parmenides and Empedo cle s has a wider con­
text. The standard conceptual frame for pre-Socratic speculation on 
the qivdt� or af.. � &Ega of things was, what I would like to call, specu­
lative predication: ny really is X",; Of this conc eptual frame the 
following are simple variants: 
(a) 11What they believe to be Y is really x " 
-· 
(b) "What they call Y is really! .. " 
(c) "The SO=Called y is really X.,11 
To (b) and fo) the formula (d ) is like a corollary: 
(d) 10It is really with reference to X that the expression uyn 
is employed,, 10 
This verbal frame) in any of the four versions) must have appeared again 
and again in explanations of natural phenomena by the early "physicists"o 
Recall Xenophanes B32! 
�v T: 71Q&�·�ai£o��&, v£qio� xa1 �o�To �£qiuxE 
KOQ<pUQEOV xai <pOIVIXEOV xa1 xAwQ�V l6fa&a1. 
nwhat they call Iris ["a goddess of such-and� such attribute d' 
that too is in its nature a cloud which looks gleaming and 
purple and green ,, 11 
What is absent from such 11physiological 10 applic ations of the 
verbal frame is the element of extreme surpri se) paradox) and irony which 
we find in Parmeni de s 0 texto It is this element which makes BB .. 38-41 
such a fitting climax t·;� the argument of BB as a whole,, The deductions 
• have taught us that what-is is ungenerable, indivisibl_e,. immob ile , 
fully completedo And now we hear that it is that very thing which mor= 
tals describe as "coming to beu and 11perisbingn etcQ The disparity 
could not be more dramatic., The gulf between implicit promise and 
actual performance could not be greatero This is precisely why 't'W 
appears without a connecting particle, in asyndeton,, Like Heraclitus�­
B2 these. lines reveal the total estrangement of men from that which is 
most properly and intimately theirs.. This point gets lost, of course, 
in the translation aemere name"o For the whole rhetoric of this passage 
depends on a confrontation of task with performanceo The absurdity of 
mortal thinking is that it misdescribe s totally whet it � inten ded to 
describeo It is not that human names are meaninglessj they are, r ather , 
widely off the mark==their marko Mortals could not have found them­
selves farther from the goal=-their goalo This is exactly what was 
meant by the 11backward=turning route18 <!J With the words 
11wi th respect to it have _been spoken, 11 and 
11having trusted Lf3C o mortal � that they be true, 11 Parmenides reminds 
us of the relation of n:[o"•�� bet-ween mind and realityo With the list 
of mortal judgments he documents the failure of the human mind to live 
up to this commitmento 
NOTES 
la This paper is based on Cho V of a larger study I am c omple t ing under 
the title: The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argu­
!!!fill:.t. 1ll, the Fragmentso I am indebted to Professor Gregory Vlastos for 
cr�ticism of an earlier draft of this chapter, and for his kindness in 
allowing me to read a paper of his, which remains unpublished, entitled 
110Name s1of Being in Parmenideso11' 
· 
2o See Leonardo Taran, Parmenides� A Text with Translation, Commentari� 
f2llli Critic al Essays (Princeton, 1965) � PPo 120-144; Jaal] Mansfeld.� . 
Die 0ffenbarung des Parmenides und __ fil menschliche �·- lAssen, 1961+) � 
PPo 65�66 � 84..,85 � 101=102� 141=11+'20 · 
3" Most critics would regard B8o34=41 a 11digression11 or 11recapitulation10 
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on Thought an� Beii:ig: so recently Raven, in G.,S,.Kirk and J,.E .. Raven, 
The Presocratic Philosophers, {Cambridge, 1957), p,.277; Mansfeld · p .. �01; W.,K..,C,. Guthrie, A History "of Greek. Philosophy, 
Vol., II, (dam­
br1dge, 1965)� pp .. 39ff .. ; for Tar an u s view see below h., 23 .. 
4 .. We find 'tav'tov .. • with referenoe to &ov only five lines above.. To 
the continuative .. • of B8 .. 29 corresponds the continuative '-t� of B8.34.,, 
The two lines are linked by what appears like a continuous chain of 
f t h t i p IP p p . P � p • ,,. ,· � " �� erenqe� 0, W a =  Si 'ta\>"tOV 't E:V 'taU'tftl0 • •  1o1.a{} e:aU't0 • •  0µtV000'tO E:OVq• 
e: 0 v • • •  't' ()(\) 't 0 '\I . 0. 
5 .. Lo T aran ,  PPoll9 and 191 argues, ri.ghtly, that lines 32�33 are a 
deduction of the attribute 't'e:Ae:cr't'ov (B8 .. 4J .. 
6 .. "The Homeric Telo s , u  Glotta� 43 (1965), p .. 44o 
7 .. ibid .. p.,47., Cf., Ernst Heit sch, 81Das Wis sen des Xenophanes,11 
Rheinisches Museum f1.i°r Philologie, NoFo, 109 (1966), pp"227ff,. 
8 .. Taran, p., 120 ;  Guthrie, II� p.39 .. 
9 .. For o-r>ve:xe:v introducing a rel ative clause with the value of a sub ... 
stant ive � cf .. lliio 3.,60fo 1tQ � ;av'ta v f e:cr3-at o�ve:xa {"that on account 
of which19) oe:vq" \1o1.oµe:cr3-c1.. See Pierre Chantraine, G;rammaire Homerigu�, 
vol. II (Paris'.* 1953) p.,286'.il and Pierre Monteil, � 72hrase relative � ' 
grec ancien:i E1tudes et Commentaicres, _no., 47 (Paris, 1963), p.,267. 
A good parallel is Plato Eu th .. 6a 't'oih" ecr't' t v o�ve:'Ka 't'�v yqcxcp�v cpe:vyw� 
In ecr'tt voe:t'v we have a case of the active infinitive in passive sense: 
cf .. Cha.ntraine, II, p .. 300; Schwyzer-Debrunner, p .. 357. E;x:amples from 
�omer ,,are: f>oe:i;; �e:v tAauveµe:v (Odo 18.,371); '21fhe:qot 1toAe:µt'l;;e:tv �crav 
Axarn t (II., 180258) ,; Exact parallels are &chacraa o" ov')tf-r' �v to€7v 
(Aisch .. Pers .. 419) and &&ava'tOV ecrxov CtQE:'t'�v, &ii;; 1taqe:cr&� OQa'\I (Soph .. 
� .. 1420)., But what is by far the most striking parallel is in a text 
which obviously derives from Eleatic arguments, the Hippocratic Art, 
Ch 2� ' " S. P P V PS. � . .,, ' D P " ' P � > 'I' D 0 • e:t yaq UT) e:cr't't y &ue:iv 'ta µT) E:O'\l't'O(, W01tE:Q 'ta E:OV't'O( OU'K O&O . Ill fJIJ D � ? . � 'iJ �  w PP � D · "  
� l)� � '\ o1twi;; av 't'ti;; au't'a vo�cre:ie: µT) e:ov't'a, a ye: e:tT) 'Kat Of8aA�o&crtv tb?tV 'Kat yvwµ'tl vo�cra& fui;; ZO't'tV. The sense is clearly: 0If non.-.oeings are there 
to see, as beings Carri/, I know not how one could regard them as non­
beings, those very things, which would be there Cfor him? to see with 
his eyes, and to know with his understanding that they are .. " No text 
could put more forcefully the idea: "It us there to see i Loo){ at it"" 
The temptation to render (bookishly and unimaginatively) the first 
�O''t t and the e:'hi of this text by 11is possible11 and "would be. possible" 
should be r e s iste d ,. The examples from Aeschylus and Sophocles ought 
to be sufficient as a deterrent.. The construction which I adopt here 
resembles that given by Uvo Holscher in 11Grammatisches zu Parmeni(les,11 
Hermes, 84 (1956)�· ppol.90ff,, But I do not share his argument for . 
treating 't'av't'ov as subject? viz .. that if voe:1'v and..,. e:Tvat were the 
subject they would be connected by Kat rather than. 't'e: 'M.a� The 
argument is obviously mistakem cf., Mansfeld, p"66; and Taran p.,44, 
Nor would I defend Holscher 9 s translation, audasselbe kann gedacht 
werden und ist zugleich dasjenige, wesha�b das gedacht� seiend ;st" 
{p .. 394), which suggests that of the two e:O''t't on the �ine the f:i.,rst 
occurs with the sense of possibility and the second with that of 
straight existential assertion., .1:-1ansfeld, J,.Q.Q.. .. cit., justifiably 
·, 
�I •. • 
�24-
criticizes H6lscherlls translation for this shift. 
lOo Taran, p.,121.. He considers it 18possible," 
construction of the simil arly worded B3 reads: 
exists· for thinking and for being" (po44L 
'• 
nevertheless, and his 
"For the same thing 
11.. Indeed, we must not give thi's translationo For it obscures the 
syntax and er a s e s the sense of presence in �O''tt voe'tv. 
12., Kurt von Fritz, in 19 Nouc; 9 Noei v and their Derivatives ::tn pre ... 
Socratic Philosophy: Part I, 19' Classical Philology, 40 (1945), P)>o 
?37-238 argued that the oiJvexev here' Which he interpJ;"eted aS OU evexev 9 has the force of the ncausa efficiens as well as the logi­
cal reaso n o 16 I suggest that we interpret the word as suggesting 
ambiguously both a final and an efficient cause .. 
13., ef'�1: Chantraine, volo II, p.,291; Monteil, p .. 268f., 
14., Now al.so Taran, p.,122f.,; and Guthrie, Vol<> II, p .. 39fo 
15., See M6nteil, pp.,268-269, and note esp., p .. 268; "la distinction 
conceptuelle entre cause et objet av un sentiment est peu nette, et 
a:isement neutra1iseee19 See also Chantraine, vol .. II, p.288: "1es 
pro po sitio ns declaratives sont issues de propositions completives 
de cause., n Cf o pp., 290-291., 
16., The particle ye in B8.,37 makes necessary the paraphrastic trans­
lation: "since it was just this thing thatu .... 0 The ye here surely 
has the force of "specifically" or "only"., 
17., Cf� Tar an, pp., 123, 126., 
18., For a review of interpretations see Taran, pp .. 123-128 • .  The 
translation, 19for you will not find thinking without (finding) ;Being 
in what has been expressed,n which he adopts from Albertelli, is 
not very plausible., It corresponds to a Greek text: o.r, yaq e-&q�O'e tc; " "' � ' " ' '"' "' " " It ld b 'tO VOetV ctVet> eOV'tO\; ev '\I01)µct't� 'tlil9 O necpct'ttO''tctt0 WOU e Very 
awkward if E:v ti.h. coming irrimediately after E:ov'toc; and emphatically 
afte.r the main caesura, .had to be con strued as refer r ing not to the 
latter but to a vaguely under stood vo1J1Hx or t..oyoc;" 
19� Cf.. tv O'ot yaq EO'µev (Soph., 0,,!_.,314); &v -.a'ti;; v�uO''i. 'twv QEA.t..�v!J.)v 
'ta nqayµct'tct eyEVE'to (Thucydo Io74J; " ., " E:v f,/ kµo�& 'tft..oc;;d/ a-{,-.oiv yfvp t'to -.�O'oE 't�c; µax1Jc;; nf qt, '9let the telos of their fight be· etermined oy 
me," ( �oph .,, O.C" 422)0 For a discussion of this use see Schwyzer­
Debrunner p.,rt58., 
20ei The word may additionally have the connotation of "spread the 
word18� cf & Jo Mansfeld nFr. B2 1,11 Rheinische§ Museum ftir Phil= 
ologll,, N.,Fo � 109 11966� pp.,95,,.96 ,, But the parallels he cites in 
t. :BJ 
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support of this are mostly fourth-century and later. 
21. The participle is similarly interpreted in Diels�Kranz and 
Mansfeld, 0ffenbarung, p.84., 
220 I take it, it is considerations such as the ones given above 
that motivate Guthriens translation and gloss 11in which Ci.e. in 
de� endence on, or in respect of whichl
·
h- it is exp_ressed .Lor reveal­
eQ! ".. (Volo II p .. 39L I would also agree with Mansfeld1's com­
ment (p.,85) that B8 .. 35':"36 amounts to the implication voe:iv --7' &ov 
For the sentence says, in effect,""""'(voe:1v· '-""' eovL which is the 
classical. definition of truth-functional implication. Now I say 
"amounts" rather than "ist klare implikative Bez·eichnung" (p.,85, 
his italics) since Parmenides0 mode of expression is more con­
crete and more pictorial., But I find the rest of Ma1nsfeld8 s 
account of B8 .. 34-36 confused.. His explication is: "D.enken 
impliziert dasjenige, weswegen der Gedanke ist,_ weil es:immer -
schon im 1 we swegen * '; d.;h., im Seienden, impliziert i st$ Par-
menide s behauptet hier die Umkehrbarkeit der irnplikativen Beziehung 
zwischen D�nken und Seiendem� p (Denken) imp q- ( Seiendes) , weil 
q imp Po 11 (p.,85) That p---7q because q-?p (!) is a fallacy 
unworthy of Parmenides.. Besides, the counterpart in the text 
of this double implication posited by Mansfeld is not clear .. 
BB .. 35-36 is surely of the form p-::>q., The "Umkehrbarkeit" 
must be in B8.,34., (Man sfeld often represents this, as well 
as B3; by the formula p �q.. But on hi.§. implicational interpre­
tation of these lines, the -.av-.ov must refer to a reciprocal 
relation .. ) If B8 .. 34 is the coimplication p �>q then. the p->q of 
B8.,35-6 is not enough to support it, much less could it be 
11gleichbeteund�11 as Mansfeld remarks a few lines above the com­
ment cited., 
23 .. Taran {ppo 1362 139-144 and 193) finds a deduction of the 
attribute µouvoye:v€i;;� "unique," in these J,.ines .. But the clause 
"since it was ,just this thing that Fate shackled°' reads more 
like a consequence or a corollary of uniqueness, rather than 
a proof of it o The deduction of µouvoye:v£i;; is more plausi-
bly found in the proof of 11indivisibility" (B8.,22-25)o The 
weakness of Taranu s interpretation here is betrayed in his 
comment: 11The characteristic of uniqueness follows by itself 
without a special demonstration" (pol41) .. 
24., I transl.ate 11therefore.,u It is generally recognized that 
lines 32-33 constitute a proof of the '°complete"' or "accom­
plished" character of ,what-is., So o-l>ve:xe:v must introduce an 
independent clause. vontrast: Taran, p.,118; Guthrie, Vol., II, 
p.34 .. 
:-26-
25. Cf. von Fritz, Po237. 
26. ibid. Pe 2'36o 
27. "We very often borrow achievement verbs to signify the performance 
of the corresponding task activities • • •  'Hear1 is sometimes used as a 
synonym of 1 listen' and 'mend 1 as a: .
. 
· sxnony
. 
m of 1 try to mend'." (Gilbert 
Ryle, p. 149f., �Concept of MindLLondon, 194.2,7.) 
2?. er. also the oxymoron in Pindar' P. 2. 61: xe:ve:Civ EATC t 6wv x.auvov 
�e:l.oi;;, "the gaping fulfilment of empty expectations." 
29. By failing to draw this distinction von Fritz, p.236, exaggerates the 
inconsistency between passages in which vooi;; etc. are connected with 
truth and others in which they are connected with error. Taran's cri­
tique of von Fritz in "El Significado de NOEIN en Parme'nides, 11 Anales. � 
W�lologia Cl�sica, 7 {1959), pp.123, 134ff., is also vitiated by the 
absence of this distinction, and results in the unconvincing thesis that 
Parm,epide s I voe:7 v and vooi;; refer indifferently to a mind that knows 
the e:ov and to mind in error. 
3p. vqn F�itz's final solution is, therefore, correct: "even the 
rc1..ayx�oi;; vooi;; of mortals cannot fail to be linked up inextricably with 
the Eov." (p. 239). But I would add the qualification that in the case 
of mortal_ opinion the link is felt as normative or jussive--as an un­
realized obligation. 
31. Cf. Tractatus, 4.002, 4.112. 
32. For purposes of brevity I have slurred over an important difference 
between Russell and Wittgenstein. The first is much more of aPlatonist. 
For him the task of philosophy is correction no less than elucidation. 
In addition with the difi'iculty of understanding the rules of projection 
we must co:pe with �he fact that a ;:tood de�l o� ever�day language is out 
of touch with reality, or represents reality in a distorted or attenu­
ated form: ''The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists 
mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we 
feel quite sure of, to somet�ing precise, clear and definite, which by 
reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we 
start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague 
thing is a sort of shadow .. 11 (Russell, "Logical Atomism,11 Lecture I). 
Contrast Wittgenstein's view:. ""In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language L]mgangsprache: the emphasis is on its 'everyday8 char­
acte:O, just as they stand, ar"e in perfect logical order.--That utterly 
simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of truth, 
but the truth itself in its entirety." {Tractatus, 5.563, p.113 .. ) It 
is, of course, this doctrine which is developed in Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy of ordinary language. Russell's, more so than Wittgenstein's, 
view is the one which bears comparison with the interpretation of Par­
menides I am developing here. 
33. In Phaedo 67bthe o� £ve:xo: points toward the ultimate fulfilment of 
·a life-long quest which is meta}horically conceived as a journey. Simi­
larly in �. 210a, 210e' 2llc where o� eve:xa introduces repeatedly 
.k-.t# 
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"the beautiful it self .. " (Cf.. Gorg. 499e-500a.,) 
tion points toward the real or ultimate subject 
The word a'lso functions to remind interlocutors 
topic of' a philosophic dialogue: Theaet., 184a; 
Charm. l58e, 165a:., 
In Rep .. 510d the preposi­
of mathematical_ thinking., 
of the specific or main 
Laws 70lc-d, 894b; 
34., nparmenides on Names," Harvard Studies in. Classical Philology, 63 
(1958), pp .. 145-160. 
35. ibid., pp .. 145-153., Woodbury0 s reading is also defended by Vlastos 
in the unpublished paper mentioned in n .. l above; it has been adopted 
by Joseph Owens, ! History of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York, 1959), 
p.65o Hermann Frankel considers the passage corrupt.. He proposes the 
emendation i:w �,ac!i ovoµaai:a t (Dichtung und Philo sonhie � !l:flll@ 
Griechentums .["Munchen, 196� p .. 408, n .. 2o:T 
36. Cf., Tar�n ppol29-31 .. 
37., For the construction see Woodbury, p .. 149 .. 
3841 This� however'.1 also argues against Woodbury's view the.t the refer-
ence of i:i;i is not to the S:ovg see above n., 34., 
39. See LSJ: s .. v .. xat..fw II .. l; s.v. t..fyw III.4; s .. v. bvoµal;;w II.l. 
40.,,. For examples see Woodbury p .. 149. The two constructions appear side 
by side in Parmenides B9, in lines 1 and 2 respectively. 
4i. One thinks immediately of Hesiod: cf. Theog. 144-45; 207-210; 
234-5·; 281-283 etc. Recall also that Hesiod8 s long lists (e.g., of the 
Nereids, Theogo 24-0ff.,) consist mostly of names which can be understood 
easily as descriptionso 
42 
.. There is a point to the periphra1sis "bright surface" if we construe 
it as an indication that the oiaµe:t'�e:tv could involve either the 
surface, or its brightness, or both .. 
43 .. It is surely be,,,tter to read l) rather than � (Diels-Kranz), to 
match the dative vo11'6' in the second half of the line. 
44. Woodbury cites the Empedocles fragment (pp.,149, 160 n .. 38) only as 
one of the examples for the/ construction ovoµal;;e: t v e1t t i; t 'V r. 
45. Taran, p@l43, takes note of the parallel with Empedocles B8 and 
observes that the latter "adopted Parmenides 1 thesis that the words of 
mortals when us·ed to assert things which do not exist are empty names. 11 
But that the names are empty (without any reference) is precisely what 
Empedocles does not say. 
46 .. Here I am conscious of echoing an argument developed by Vlastos in 
the paper mentioned in n.,l above .. 
